Two years ago I did a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggesting that if a well-run state is to use surveillance to prevent or investigate politically motivated violence, then it has to spend considerably more than €3000 per year and person to get results (where
person means anyone who might be willing to help plan or carry out political violence).
The limit is higher: The €3000 did not include the price of xkeyscore and the other ineffective programs that have since come to light. Most of that cost is borne by the USA, but the
500 million records supplied monthly by Germans will have cost something.
I suppose it's theoretically possible that the names of known Nazis weren't added to the list of suspects, but I can't bring myself to believe it. These are people who gather in the woods to practise with guns, and their names are in a database run by someone who supplied data to the NSA. They must have been added.
So xkeyscore had the names of Mundlos, Böhnhard, Zschäpe and probably everyone who helped them, and it found nothing, neither before any of the killings nor afterwards.
It found one thing, though: Laura Poitras had 400 out of 400 points on the risk scale, and in the event she has turned out to be a great risk to job security at the NSA.
A security guard at an airport confiscated my razor blades today. I've carried razor blades in my hand luggage since 2004 (inadvertently on the first few dozen flights, knowingly and together with my razor on a hundred or more since I found the blades). Usually the guards want to look at my razor and the corkscrew I also carry, but until today noone has asked whether I might perhaps have any blades for the razor.
He also found, and let me keep, my forbidden shampoo and aftershave. And he checked whether I had a blade in the razor. Such clue. Maybe there is hope for mankind.
Deutsche Telekom has published a live overview of internet security. It's good news, just look at the
top 5 attack types.
Here's a screenshot, in case Telekom learns that traceroute isn't a weapon and starts excluding it from the list of attack types:
I'm going to assume that 50% of what Telekom sees is innocent, ie. half the
attacks on SMB protocol are fat-fingered configurations. (I know I've fat-fingered someone's port 5353 not long ago.) That leaves 13 million SMB attacks last month, 690,000 traceroute invocations, and the other kinds of attacks are less common than traceroute.
If there are fewer attacks than traceroute invocations on everything except that one notorious Microsoft target, the world can't be too badly off. Have a nice day.
I ditched the old laptop bag and got a new one. Much better. The new one is roomier on the inside than outside — and just as dangerous to aircraft security. Things end up in it that I don't know about. During my first two trips with the new bag, I have already brought several dangerous materials undetected through security checkpoints: dangerous liquids (an orange, a large bottle of hair conditioner), a sharp knife and of course something explosive.